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SUPPLEMENf AL MEMO RE MEMO FROM SG 
No. 72-312 
Merrill, Lynch v. Ware(one of Jay's cases) 
The Conference asked for the views of the SG. 
The SG recommends that cert be denied, stating essentially 
that the preemption issue was not properly presented 
below. As to the California statutory provision's 
effect on federal antitrust laws, the SG statesa 
"It is well-recognized that state laws preserving 
competition can effectively complement federal 
antitrust policy, and even, in the exercise of 
the state's reserved police powers, go beyond it, 
so long as the functioning of the federal system 
is not disturbed." 
The point of the latter argument is, I take it, that 
the California law des violate the Commerce Clause 




9~ ~ MERRJLL, LYNCH v. WARE ·~ ~ 1. SUMMATION. The basic question is whether state laws 
~ -~ermitting actions for the collection of wages to be maintained in a 
CSJP ;:: .J. p ~ ud~m ~~ state laws prohibiting restraint on occupational changes 
withstand any pr~emptive effect of self regulating rules of the New York 
Stock Exchange promulgated pursuant to § 6 of the Security Exchange 
" 
Act of 1934. The California Court of Appeals First Appellate District 
concluded the state policies were paramount. The California Supreme 
Court apparently declined review. Petitioners seek review of the 
decision of the California Court of Appeals. 





2. FACTS. In July 1958 Respondent became an employee of 
petitioner Merrill Lynch at its San Francisco office as an account 
executive, remaining until 1969 when he voluntarily terminated his 
employment. He then became an employee of a competitor with Merrill 
Lynch. As a full time employee of Merrill Lynch respondent was able 
to participate in its profit sharing plan. At the termination of his 
employment respondent's account in the profit sharing fund was credited 
\ 
with 733 vested units and 1, 258 unvested units. Article 11. 1 of the 
profit sharing plan provides: 
I 
A participant who, in the determination of the Committee, 
voluntarily terminates his employment with the corporation 
. . . and engages in an occupation which is, in the determina-
tion of the Committee, competitive with the corporation ... 
shall forfeit all rights to any benefits otherwise due or to 
become due from the trust fund with respect to units credited 
for fiscal years subsequent to the fiscal year ended December 
30, 1960. " 
On April 18, 1969 the administrative committee of the plan made a 
determination that respondent had voluntarily terminated his employment 
with Merrill Lynch and had entered into competitive employment. Under 
Article 11. 1 of the plan, the committee thereupon caused to be forfeited 
any and all rights respondent had in the plan. 
Merrill Lynch is a member of the New York Stock Exchange 
which is registered under § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
which authorizes the enforcement of rules and bylaws promulgated 





Under Rule 345 of the Exchange,, respondent executed a written 
application for approval of employment and was approved and registered. 
On the application was written the following statement: 
I agree that any controversy between me and any . 
member organization arising out of my employment on 
the termination of my employment by and with such . . . 
member organization shall be settled by arbitration at 
the instance of any such party in accordance with the 
constitution and rules then obtaining of the New York 
Stock Exchange. 
At the time this form was executed by respondent, a rule of the Exchange 
provided for arbitration of all matters arising out of the termination of 
employment. 
3. OPINION OF THE COURT BELOW. In the court below, 
respondent contended that § 229 of the California Labor Code voided the 
arbitration agreement. That section provides that: 
Actiort>to enforce the collection of due and unpaid wages 
claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard 
to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. 
The California court decided that the intent of the statute was to provide 
in the first instance a judicial forum where t.here exists a dispute as ., ,, 
to wages. The court then decided that the term wages should include 
-not only periodic monetary earnings of an employee but also the other 
benefits to which he was entitled as a part of his compensation, such ---as the profit sharing plan in question. The court then decided that 
§ 229 and the strong state policy protected thereby voided the arbitration 
clause in the application for employment. 
Respondent also contended in the court below that the forfeiture 
provision is unlawful as a restraint of trade under th·e California 
( 
4. 
Business and Professions Code § 16600. That section explicitly declares 
that: 
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of 
any kind is to that extent void. 
The California court then quickly decided that the above section voided 
the forfeiture provision in Article 11. 1 of the Merrill Lynch profit 
sharing plan. 
4. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. Petitioner.'B chief 
contention is that the decision of the California court greatly interferes 
with the desire of Congress, expressed in § 6 of the Securities Exchange 
---------
Act of 1934, to establish a statutory scheme of supervised self regulation 
by stock exchanges. Petitioner contends that the application of California 
Labor Code 229 defeats that very objective and renders the self regulatory 
rule of the exchange a nullity. Petitioner analogizes this case to federal 
labor law where petitioner contends the principle is firmly established 
that incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles 
of federal labor law. Petitioner contends self regulation of the exchanges 
is thwarted by any possibility that arbitration may or may not be 
permitted under the laws of different states. Petitioner contends that 
uniformity can only be assured by permitting the self regulatory 
arbitration provisions of the exchange to prevail over inconsistent local 
laws and thereby fulfill the congressional objectives. 
( 
5. 
Petitioner also contends that federal courts have consistently 
upheld arbitration rules in the face of challenges under federal antitrust 
laws to the conduct or acts or rules sought to be arbitrated. Petitioner 
contends that if federal antitrust laws cannot overcome the federal 
policy of arbitration and self regulation, neither can similar state laws. 
Petitioner contends that that part of the decision of the court 
below which voided the forfeiture provision operated as an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce. Petitioner contends that its profit 
sharing plan operates on a national and international level, that its 
employees are engaged in interstate commerce, that except for three 
states, others have upheld the forfeiture provision, and finally that 
the decision of the court below leaves Merrill Lynch with the alternative 
of maintaining two plans, one for California and one for the rest of 
its personnel, national and international. 
Petitioner concludes briefly that this case has great importance 
for a large number of major corporations who have similar forfeiture 
provisions in their profit sharing plans. 
Respondents, in a seemingly disjoirled brief, contend this 
decision does not involve application of any state or federal antitrust 
laws. Respondents' chief contention seems to be that the intent behind 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to insure fair dealing and to 




employer-employee relations within the securities industry, despite 
the existence of any private arbitration agreement. Respondents further 
contend that the decision of the California Court of Appeals is not a 
final order but is rather interlocutory in nature, since in point of fact 
no judgment has been entered on the pleadings in this case. Respondent 
concedes, however, that such orders as this are made appealable under 
the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
5. DISCUSSION. At first blush this appears to present a 
significant preemption question under § 6 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (Appendix A). There is no discussion in either the briefs 
or the opinion below of the actual wording or legislative history of this 
section of the Act. Nor is any relevant precedent of this Court cited 
by the parties which is helpful to the issues herein. In the absence 
of the above, I will hazard my own views as to why the preemption claim 
petitioner makes may be deficient: 
(1) Though some significant argument can be made that the 
intent of § 6 is to promote Exchange self regulation in the interest 
of protecting the investing public, one could question whether a rule 
which dealt not with protection of the investing public, but rather with 
internal employment matters within the exchange claims the same 
statutory protection. 
(2) Unlike the Labor Management Relations Act, the Securities 




arbitration thus finds support not in the wording of a federal statute but 
rather in the rules of the exchange promulgated pursuant to very broad 
statutory authority. 
( 3) Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act does attach some 
importance to the existence of state laws: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent 
any exchange from adopting and enforcing any rule 
not inconsistent with this chapter and the rules and 
regulations thereunder and the applicable laws of the 
state in which it is located. (emphasis added). 
( 4) The-s'"ats hws which were used to strike down the forfeiture 
provision of petitioner's profit sharing plan and the arbitration provision 
of the Exchange promoted valid state interests: in the one case the 
desire of California to make a judicial forum available for the settlement 
of wage disputes in the first instance, and on the other the state interest 
• in protecting occuptional mobility for its citizens. But just how far 
and in what instances state interests can be allowed to fracture the 
uniformity of the Exchange regulations seems an important question. 





STATUTORY PROV1SIONS INVOLVED 
United States Code, Title 15: 
§78f. Registration of national securities exchanges. 
(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national 
securities exchange under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided 
in this section, by filing a registration statement in such form as the 
Commission may prescribe, containing the agreements, setting forth 
the information, and accompanied by the documents below specified: 
* * * 
(2) Such data as to its organization, rules or procedure, and 
membership ... 
(3) Dopies of its constitution, articles of incorporation with all amend-
ments thereto, and of its existing bylaws or rules or instruments 
corresponding thereto, whatever the name, which are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "rules of the exchange; n • 
* * * 
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent any exchange 
from adopting and enforcing any rule not inconsistent with this chapter 
and the rules and regulations thereunder and the applicable laws of the 
state in which it is located. 
(d) If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for 
registration is so organized as to be able to comply with the provisions 
of this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder and that the 
rules of the exchange are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and 
to protect investors, the Commission shall cause such exchange to be 
registered as a national securities exchange. 
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Summer Memorandum 
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having 
read most of the briefs . It is entirely preliminary and, 
in large degree superficial . Further study is indicated. 
State of the Case 
Petitioner, a member of the N. Y. Stock Exchange, had 
a profit sharing plan which provided that an employee who 
voluntarily terminates employment and engages in competition 
forfeits his vested interest in the plan . Respondent 
terminated his employment and went to work for a competing 
broker . He sued in the California state court, seeking his 
accrued share of the profit sharing fund (all of which came 
from contributions by the employer) . 
The trial court, without opinion, held for respondent. 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding : (i) that 
the contract between petitioner and respondent was valid, 
including the provision therein for arbitration; (ii) but that 
the forfeiture provision of the profit sharing plan was an 
unlawful restraint of trade violative of California Code 
$ec . 16,600 and thus unenforcable; and (iii) also that 
respondent's action was a suit for "wages " and thus could be 
maintained under California Labor Code Sec . 229 without regard 
to the arbitration agreement . 
2. 
Questions Presented 
Although the questions presented on the briefs in this 
Court do not, in all respects, conform to those addressed by the 
California Court - and also in some respects the questions seem 
confused and unclear - they may be summarized generally as follows : 
(a) whether California Sec . 229, as applied to the 
arbitration agreement between a New York Stock Exchange member 
and its employee, conflicts with - and is preempted by - Rule 
347 (b) promulgated by the SEC under the Act of 1934 . 
(b) whether California Sec . 16,600 is, in effect, 
preempted by Rule 347 (b) wk±KN of the N. Y. wk±~kx Stock Exchange -
whi ch provides that any controversy between an employee and 
member organization 11 shall be settled by arbitration" . 
( c) whether the application of California law to 
an interstate brokerage firm burdens interstate commerce . 
Discussion 
The California Court held that the forfeiture 
provision in the agreement was ineffective (void) under 
California Sec . 16,600 as being a contract " in restraint of 
trade". In view of this holding, it is not clear to me - at 
least at this point in my study - why the Court reached the 
second question as to arbitration . But it went on to hold that 
profit sharing benefits are "wages " under California law, and 
that under California Sec . 229 disputes as to wages are not 
3. 
arbitrable . I suppose we are bound by these interpretations 
of California law . 
This brings us to the question of "preemption11 -
which is the ~x±mxx±x~ primary issue argued by the parties . 
The Solicitor General (SG) in a memorandum amicus devotes 
primary attention to the preemption issue . He argues that 
federal policy favoring arbitration, as reflected in Sec . 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, is not applicable as that 
statute applies only to questions arising under collective 
bargaining agreements - not to individual contracts . But the 
SG's brief does not address fully, or as specifically as I 
would have hoped, the petitioner ' s position that Sec . 229 
prohibiting abritration of wage disputes unless arbitration is 
required by a collective bargaining agreement, conflicts with -
and is preempted by - Rule 347(b) of the New York Stock Exchange 
which requires arbitration of employment disputes between 
member firms and their employees . This rule was promulgated 
under Sec . 6 of the Act of 1934, and is in accord - it is 
argued with a congressional policy of assuring order and 
uniformity in the securities industry with respect to 
employer/employee relationships . Reliance is placed by 
petitioner on Silver v . New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341 -
which I need to read more carefully . 
I find nothing of substance in the Interstate Commerce 
argument, but remain in considerable doubt as to the narrow 
preemption issue (as I understand it) relied on primarily by 
petitioner. 
Research by my Clerks 
4. 
The appropriate law clerk should read the relevant 
authorities and the briefs more carefully, with the view to 
educating me as to the preemption issue. The briefs of the 
parties scatter their shots in so many directions, it is difficult 
in a hurried reading to identify the possibly meritorious 
positions from those that may be quite irrelevant . Moreover, 
although vast numbers of cases are cited, I have not found one 
which even approaches being dispositive . In short, further 
study is indicated . 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: John Jeffries DATE: October 3, 1973 
No. 72-312, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
v. Ware, et al 
The parties in this case have filed two long essays in the misuse 
of authority. It may be helpful, therefore, to begin by sorting out 
some of the issues that I consider irrelevant. 
First, this case is not controlled by the United States Arbitration 
--==-
Clause, 9 U.S. C. § § 1 et seq. Petitioner contends that the statute 
creates federal substantive law equally applicable in federal and 
state courts. Despite the explicit dictum to that effect in Robert 
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 221 F. ed 482 (2nd Cir. 
1959), it is not entirely clear that this is the law. The remedies 
provisions in § § 3 and 4 are limited by terms to the federal courts. 
Even if §§ 1 and 2 are applicable in state courts, then provisions have 
little impact on this case. Section 2 provides that argreements to 
arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law and in equity for the revocation of any 
contract." Thus the federal substantive policy favoring arbitration 
2. 
is dependent on the legality of the agreement under state law. 
Furthermore, as respondent points out, it is at least arguable 
that the exemption in § l reaches this employment contract ("nothing 
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce"). Some courts, however, have construed 
this exception to encompass only workers engaged in the actual movement 
of goods in interstate commerce. E.g., Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F. 
2d 7 83 (1st Cir. 1971). The opinion of this Court in Prima Paint v. 
Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (endorsing the severability 
doctrine as a matter of federal substantive law), is not applicable to 
this case. That decision rested on § 4 of the Act and was expressly 
limited to the federal courts. 
Second, this case does not implicate Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 
(1953). In Wilko an investor sued a securities brokerage firm in federal 
court. The defendant invoked the U.S. Arbitration Act to compel 
arbitration pursuant to an agreement signed by the customer. This 
Court held waiver of the right to a judicial forum barred by § 14 of the 
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n: 
"Any condition, stipulation, or prov1s10n 
binding any person acquiring any security to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter 
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission 
shall be void. " 
3. 
This case does not involve the 1933 Act, but respondent relies on 
the parallel anti-waiver provision in§ 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78 cc(a): 
"Any condition, stipulation, or prov1s10n 
binding any person to waive compliance with any 
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder, or of any rule of and exchange required 
thereby shall be void." 
Respondent correctly points out that the 1934 anti-waiver provision, 
unlike § 14 of the 1933 Act, is not limited to purchasers of securities. 
Respondent, however, does not claim any substantive right under the -
federal securities laws; he attacks the validity of his employment 
contract under a California antitrust statute. Therefore, enforcement 
of the arbitration agreement would not effect a waiver of compliance 
with any securities statute, rule, or regulation. To my mind, § 29(a) 
is by its terms inapplicable. And if § 19(a) does reach this case, 
petitioner claims an exemption from its force under § 28(b) of the 
Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78bb(b): 
'~othing in this chapter shall be construed 
to modify existing law (1) with regard to the binding 
effect on any member of any exchange of any action 
taken by the authorities of such exchange to settle 
disputes between its members, or (2) with regard to 
the binding effect of such action on any person who has 
agreed to become bound thereby .... " 
4. 
Some courts have construed § 28(b) as exempting arbitration agree-
ments from the anti-waiver rule of§ 29(a). E.~., Brown v. Gilligan, Will 
& Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). Respondent contends that 
Brown is bad law and in any event inapplicable to this case because 
concerned two member firms. It may be true that the policy behind Wilko 
v. Swan is more nearly applicable to a dispute between a member firm and 
an employee than to a dispute between two member firms, § 28(b) on its 
face reaches "any person." If the question is whether an agreement to 
arbitrate is an "action" within the meaning of the statute, ample 
precedent calls for an affirmative answer. Brown, supra; Coenen v. R. W. 
Pressprich & Co., 453 F. 2d 1209 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
Third, respondent's argument concerning Article VIII, § 6 of the 
NYSE constitution is irrelevant to this case. See pp. 13-14 of the brief, 
Article VIII provides that any dispute between a member and a non-menber 
must be submitted to arbitration "at the instance of such non-member." 
Respondent apparently believes that Exchange Rule 347(b) is invalid 
because it allows a member firm to compel arbitration in any dispute 
with a registered representative. Whatever the merit of this claim 
( and I am inclined to believe there is none), it is properly addressed 
to the arbitrator, at least in the first instance. 
5. 
The case most nearly in point is Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. --
341 (19 63). In Silver this Court considered the accomodation of the 1934 
Act with federal antitrust law. As Justice Goldberg phrased it, the 
question was whether the exchange's duty of self-regulation was so 
comprehensive as to constitute an implied repealer of the antitrust 
laws. Of course, Silver does not control this case. The latter does 
not involve the interface between competing federal statutes but 
rather, as the parties sometimes seem to forget, a question of 
federal preemption of state law. But analysis of this issue should be /I 
informed by reference to the reasoning of Silver. 
The general scheme of exchange self-regulation is aptly described 
in Silver: 
"Thus arose the federally mandated duty 
of self-policing by exchanges. Instead of giving 
the Commission the power to curb specific instances 
of abuse, the Act placed in the exchanges a duty to 
register with the Commission, § 5, 15 U.S. C. § 78e, 
and decreed that registration could not be granted 
unless the exchange submitted copies of its rules, 
§ 6 (a)(3), 15 U.S. C. § 78f (a)(3), and unless such 
rules were "just and adequate to insure fair dealing 
and to protect investors," § 6(d), 15 U.S. C. § 78f (d). 
The general dimensions of the duty of self-regulation 
are suggested by § l9(b) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78s(b), 
\ 
which gives the Commission power to order changes in 
exchange rules respecting a number of subjects. . .. 
"One aspect of the statutorily imposed duty 
of self-regulation is the obligation to formulate rules 
governing the conduct of exc ange members. The 
Act specifically requires that registration cannot be 
granted "unless the rules of the exchange include 
provision for expulsion, suspension, or disciplining 
of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent 
with just and equitable principles of trade .... " 
§6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (b). 373 U.S., at 352-53. 
6. 
As the guiding principle for reconciling this duty with the antitrust 
laws, the Court announced that, "Repeal is to be implied only if 
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only 
to the minimum extent nece·ssary." 373 U.S., at 357. The passage 
quoted above identifies two normative criteria for exchange rules. 
They should (1) "insure fair deal and ... protect investors and 
(2) discourage "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and 
equitable principles of trade." An exchange rule fulfilling one of 
these goals should have preemptive effect. 
If you accept Silver as the appropriate framework for analysis 
f) 
of the preemption issue, the case boils down to this: .lit an exchange ------
rule requiring arbitration of any dispute which develops between a 
member firm and its registered representative and which arises out of 
the employment or termination of employment of that representative 
"fall within the scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act"? 
7. 
Silver, 373 U.S. , at 361. In other words, is such a rule sufficiently 
close to the core of the statutory duty of self-regulation that it 
preempts the California statute guaranteeing a judicial forum? 
The scant authority that exists suggests an affirmative answer. Rust v. 
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. N.Y. 1972); Dicksteinv. 
DuPont, 413 F. 2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971). Neither of these cases, however, 
is directly on point. Although I have not exhausted the opportunities 
for research, I do not believe you will find substantial guidance in 
the decisions of the lower courts. I might add that I think your 
evaluation of the competing interests involved will be decidedly more 
perceptive and sophisticated than anything I could come up with. The 
exchange's interest in requiring arbitration of employment-related 
disputes between members and their registered representatives does - -
not strike me as slight or trivial; nor do I believe it is essential to 
the continued fulfillment of its statutory duty of self-regulation. 
There is one point I would like to make. To my mind, }he 
substance of the underlying dispute between these parties -- whether 
the California antitrust statute invalidates the employment contract --
i~ relevant to this case in its current posture. The issue is whether 
the exchange rule requiring arbitration preempts the California statute 
guaranteeing a judie ial forum. This question would be the same no 
matter what the underlying dispute between the parties. 
JCJjr 
No. 72-312, Merrill Lynch v. Ware 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM RE DISPOSITION 
Disposition along the following lines seems appro-
priate to me. In light of the confusion below about the 
relevant issues, this Court should identify the controlling 
question, announce the appropriate standard for determination 
of that question, and remand for reconsideration by the Califor-
nia courts. 
I I l\ 
To my mind, the controlling issue is preemption, -------- -- --- --
though as a prelude to that question, this Court should 
determine the effect of the U.S. Arbitration Act in this 
context. The appropriate standard for deciding the preemption 
-- ------- ------
question is derived from Silver. Of course, as you will see 
----------------
from reading Silver, bare reference to that case does not 
greatly illumine the issue, but I would take that case as the 
starting point and developea test grounded in the relation of 
any Exchange rule to the statutorily imposed duty of self-
regulation. This Court should state explicitly that the 
California anti-trust law is only secondarily relevant to 
the arbitration issue. The remand would leave the parties 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS November 26, 1973 
· Dear Harry: 
Please join :roo in your opinion 
in 72-312, Nerrill, Lynch v. Ware. 
William o. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The;Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~u:prtmt <!j:lrud 1lf t4t 'Jtim±tlt ~t1:l-4£E 
'Wh:t£E1fiughm. tn. <!):. 2U,S'!-~ . 
November 27, 1973 
Re: No. 72-312 - Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Inc. v .. Ware 
Dear Harry: 
I give up. Join me please. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice. Blackrnun 
Copies to Conference 
,{ -t..t -iL ~ £+ iL ;.t( It ;1w 
A(._ Jw, -fr, u-/. f . cL- b._}) J. ~  
~ . do. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTir.E BYRO N R . WHITE 
~tt;.tttmt (!fo-tttf o-f tlr~ ~ttrult $5~a±c£f 
1tla£f1rhtgton, tfl. <!f. 20,?>~.;1 
November 27, 1973 
Re: No. 72-312 - Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Inc. v. Ware 
Dear Harry: 
I give up. Join me please. 
Sincerely, . 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
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Sincerely, 
,, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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JUSTICE wM. J . BRENNAN. JR. November 28, 1973 
RE: No. 72-312 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, etc. 
v. Ware 
Dear Harry: 
I also give up. Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
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CHAMI!IERS OP" 
JUSTicEwM. J . eRENNAN, JR. November 28, 1973 
RE: No. 72-312 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, etc. 
v. Ware 
Dear Harry: 
I also give up. Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
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';maf.llringto-tt. gl. <!J. 20~Jf.;~ · 
72-312 - Merrill Lynch v. Ware 
Dear Harry, 
I should appreciate your adding the 
following at the foot of your opinion for the 
Court in this case: 
MR. JUSTICE STEW ART took no part in 
the decision of this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
;%>u:pu1ru <qcu.rt cf tlrt %titt~ .it~t~ 
1na£fllington, [D. <q. 20'.?"~2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 28, 1973 
Re: No. 72-312 -- Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
v. Ware et al. 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Black mun 
cc: The Conference 
~ltpt"tmt ~o-u.rt o-f tirt ~mttb ~fctftg 
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CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
November 28, 1973 
Re: No. 72-312 -Merrill Lynch, et al., v. Ware 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
tHE CHIEf JUSTICE November 29, 1973 
Re: 73-312 - Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
v. Ware 
De,p.r Harry: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Con£ erence 

To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justic8 DouglaS' 
Mr. J~stice Brennan 
Mr. Just-Lee Stewart 
Mr. Jt•Bt] ce \VhHe 
Ur · Jus-i.;ice Mar·8ball 
Mr. Justice Powell c/" 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lst DRAF1 From : Blacknmn J ' . 
UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA TE&:culated: 
... "'"o . 72-312 Recirculated: 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc .. Petitioner, 
'1) . 
David Warr et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the Court of Appeal of 
California, First Appel-
late District. 
LDecembPr -. 1973J 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question whether certain rules 
of the New York Stock Exchange, promulgated as self-
regulating measures pursuant to ~ 6 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78f, and a broker's 
employee's pledge to abide by those rules, pre-empt 
avenues of wage relief otherwise available to the em-
ployee under state law. The California Court of Appeal 
answered this in the negative. 24 Cal. App. 3d 35. 100 
Cal. Rptr. 791 ( 1972). Because of the significance of 
the question in the area of federal-state relations, we 
grantPd certiorari. 410 U. S. 908 ( 1973) . 
I 
Respondent David Ware in July 1958 entered the 
employ of petitioner Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith. Inc., a New York corporation, as a registered 
representative or "account executive" in the petitioner's 
San Francisco office_ Ware worked there continuously 
until March 1969 when he voluntarily terminated that 
relationship and accepted a similar position in San Fran-· 
cisco with one of Merrill Lynch 's competitors. 
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Merrill Lynch is a broker-dealer in securities and is 
a member-corporation of the New York Stock Exchange. 
Since prior to 1958. the finn has had a noncontributory 
Profit Sharing Plan for its employees in the United States. 
P nder the Plan an employee may have allocated to his 
account both vested and unvested units. as therein de-
scribed. Article 11 of the Plan relates to "Forfeiture 
of Benefits'' upon the happening of specified events. 
Oue such event is competitive activity : 
''11.1 A Participant who, in the determination 
of the Committee. voluntarily terminates his em-
ployment with the Corporation or provokes his ter-
mination ami engages in an occupation which is, 
w the determination of the Committee, competitive 
with the Corporation, or any affiliate or subsidiary 
thereof, shall forfeit all rights to any benefits other-
wise due or to become due from the Trust Fund 
with respect to units credited for fiscal years sub-
sequent to the fiscal year ended December 30, 1960." 
The Committee referred to is provided for by the Plan 's 
Art. 1. It has not less than five nor more than nine 
persons (not necessarily employees) appointed by Merrill 
Lynch and serving "at the pleasure of the Corporation." 
Article 1.2 states that the Committee "shall administer 
the Plan" and "shall determine any questions arising in 
the administration, interpretation and application of the 
Plan , which determination shall be conclusive and bind-
ing on all persons '·' 
At the time Ware terminated his employment with 
Merrill Lynch in March 1969. both vested and unvested 
units were allocated to his account. Upon his departure. 
the Committee. pursuant to Art. 11.1 , determined that 
Ware. by entering competitive employment, had forfeited 
all rights to henefi ts due or t.o become due him Ullder-
the Plan, 
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ln January 1970 Ware filed this class action suit in 
California state court against Merrill Lynch and the 
members of the CommitteE-'. The class purported to con-
sist of Ware and all other similarly situated former 
Merrill Lynch employees in California. Declaratory re-
lief was sought to the effect that Art. 11.1 was "unlawful 
and void under applicable California law," and that the 
defendants were obligated to pay all vested units credited 
from December 30. 1960. ho the date of termination of 
employment 
Although the statute was not. cited in the complaint, 
the parties appt(ar to agree that the suit rested prin-
cipally on ~ 16600 of the California Business and Pro=-
fessions Code. This reads : 
"Except as provided in this chapter. every contract 
by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a 
lawful profession. trade, or business of any kind is to 
that extent void ,' 
l11 its answer, Mernll Lynch alleged that the provi-
siOns of Art. 11.1 were a reasonable restraint on com-
petition under the laws of New York or of the United 
States; that, pursuant to Art. 22.1' of the Plan. it was 
to be construed according to the Jaws of New York; 
that under "\lew York law Art. 11.1 is lawful. valid, and 
enforceable ; that a condition of Ware's employment with 
Merrill Lynch was approval by the New York Stock 
Exchange; that Ware. at the time of his employment 
in 1 9.18, executed a written application. on an Exchange 
form, for approval of his employment as a registered 
representativf' , as requiretl by the Exchange's Rule 
f. '"22 l Thr vabdtty of th(' Plan or oi i.ll1.)' or thP provi~ions thrreol' 
,.;hall bf' drtermined undrr and ~hall br ron~trued arcordjng to the 
htw~ of thP Stat<> of New York ·· 
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:~43 (a l ( 1) ; " that by 11 30 ( J) of that form Ware agreed 
that any controversy with a member arising out of the 
termination of his employment shall be settled by arbi-
tration at the instance of ally party; " that the Exchange 
approved the application; that Ware's sole remedy was 
arbitration; and that a declaration that Art. 11.1 was 
in valid under the laws of California would cause Merrill 
Lynch to discriminate in the achmmstration of the Plan 
and would deprive it of clue process of law 
2 • Hnlt~ 345 . (a) Xo mrmbrr or mrmbrr organization ~hall 
· ( l J pe>rmtt any prro<on to JWrform rrgula rly thr duties custom-
anly prrformed b~· <I regt~trrrd rPJll'PHrntntive. nnle~s :such per:son 
,;hall have regt:,;trrrd wttb nnd 1" aecPptnble to the Exchange. 
~ Paragraph :30 (.J) of tlw Exchange form read~. 
' (,J) l agree that an~- controver~y betwr(•ll me and any 
member organizat wn amilng out of my employmrnt or the termi-
nation of m~· employnwnt h~- and with such .. member orgamza-
tion Hhall bC' ~rttled by arbitration at the mstance of any such party 
in accordance with the Con~t1tutwn and rulr::; then obtammg of the 
New York Stock Exchange. " 
Paragraph :30 (d) of ilw ,;a rn(• form rrad:,; : 
'(d) I have rrad the Con~tttutton and Hules of the Board of 
Governors of the Nrw York Stock Exchange and, tf approved, 1 
hereby pledge m~·sp[f to abidr b\' thr Con~titution and Rules of thr 
Board of Govemor::; of the l\'rw York Stock Exchange as the same 
ha vr brrn or "hall br from t ImP to t imr amrnded, and by all mles 
and regulation.- adoptPd pur:,;w1nt to thr ConstitutiOn , and by all 
practtcrs of tlw Exehangt>.' 
Rule :H7 (b) of thP Nrw York Stock Exchange, adoptt>d in April 
Hl5R. pnor to Wa rr '~ employment, providr~ . 
" (b) Any cont rovrr~y bt>twPrn a regt8t ered represpntativP and 
any . . member orgamzatiOn ansmg out of the employment or 
terrnmatton of rmployment of Hnch rcgi"tcred rcpre.~entativc by and 
w1th such .. mr mbrr orgamzatwn ;;hall lJC' srttlrd by arbitration, 
at the mstance of any wch part~· . m accordancr with the urbitation 
wocrdurr prescribed rbewlwre in th('se niles. ·· 
It IS thns apparrnt that ,! :~0 (.1) of tlw form follow~ the langnaf!;e· 
o f the Exchange 's Rule 347 (hl . 
' . 
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Merrill Lynch. invoking~ 1281.2 of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure,' petitioned the state court for an 
order directing arbitration pursuant to the above quoted 
f[ 30 (.J) and Ware's pledge, contained in his application 
for approval of employment, that he would "abide by 
the Constitution and Rules of the Board of Governors of 
the New York Stock Exchange" and that he submitted 
himself "to the jurisdiction of such Exchange." 
Ware opposed arbitration on tho grounds that no con-
tract to arbitrate existed between him and Merrill Lynch, 
t.hat if an agreement to this effect existed, it was a con-
tract of adhesion; and that, since ~ 16600 made the for-
feiture provision illegal under Californina law. it was not 
arbitrable. 
The state tnal court. by mmute order, denied the 
petition to compel arbitration. 
Merrill Lynch then appealed. The California Court 
of Appeal held that a written agreement to arbitrate 
did exist; that the Exchange form was "a contractual 
agreement ''; and that the "approval and registration by 
Merrill Lynch made the application a contract between 
the parties." 24 Cal. App. 3d, at 40-41. 100 Cal. Rptr., 
at 795- 796 The court went on to hold, however, that 
the forfeiture clause was invalid and unenforceable under 
California law, when applied to California residents, as 
1 "§ 12111.2 Ordrr to arbttrate rontrovrr;:;~ · , pehtton, drtrrmina-
t ion of court. 
'Ou p!'tthon ol a party to nn <trbllratwn agrcrmrnt alleging thr 
!'XJ~tenrr of a wnttrn al!:rcemrnt to arbttratr a controvrr~y and that 
a party thrreto rrfu~<'~ to arbttrntr such controver;:;~·. thr court ~ha ll 
ordC'l' thr JWtltwner and tlw rr~ponclrnt to arbJtrntr thr controversy 
it It clrtermmco. that an agrrrmPut to arbitratr the eontrovrrsy 
PXJ~t~. uillr::;s it determine::; that : 
' (a) Tlw nght. to comprl arhJtrattOII has b!'en wmved by the 
Jlf'tll!OIIer , Ul 
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bemg m rcstra1nt of trade. U Cal. App. 3d, at 42-43. 
100 Cal. Ilptr .. at 796- 797. Cited as supporting authori-
tit's WE're Prame Y. Merrill Lynch , Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
fnt .. 20 Cal. App. 3d 668. 97 C'al. Rptr. 811 ( 1971), where 
the salll(' forfeiture claust' was held ineffective under 
California law. but wherE' the court also held that an 
t'nforceable agreement to arbitrate existed,'; and Muggill 
' Re·ube11 H Dmmelley Corp ., 62 Cal. 2cl 230. 3~)8 P. 2d 
147 !1H65J 
Finally, the Court of Appeal, while taking note of 
( 'alifornia's "strong public policy" favoring arbitration. 
held that lVIC'rnll Lynch 's co11tributions under its Profit 
' l11 Fmme. dPclclNl on!~· hv<' moilth;:, rarllN . tlw ~anw Cahforma 
~ ourt of AppPal reversed a trw! <·ourt '~ orde-r deuywg arbitration 
and thu~ "l'<'mJngl~ · a!TlvPd ;d an ult1matr rp;;ult oppo::nte that 
rrarlwd 1n thr prr,;ent ea~P. Thr court hrld, 20 Cal. App. 3d, at 
(j/J -()7:~. 97 Cal. HPptr., at Kl:~-kl5, that Framr (hkP Warr) had 
madr an agrr<>rnl'nt to arb1tratC'; that then• wn s no ba~1s for u~mg 
tlw doctnnr ol adhr::non to avOid arbJtr;ttion, that the forfr1tnrP 
provlHIOil of Art . 11.1 wa::; mrtl'ectlvC' undrr § HiGOO ; that the agrer-
mrnt\ pron~1011 that Nc•w York Jaw was to apply "must not bP 
nllowl'd to drfeat '' thl' pohr.1· of§ lfi()QO, that , howc>vrr, the rntJrr 
contract wa:- not nrcc·ssa nly unlawful ; and that a 
' la tc>nt !Jll<'i<tiOll <'XIHt;; a~ to wlwtlwr tlw a~?:rt'l'nlPtlls of the partieA 
ma.\ IJ(' <'on:-;t ruc·d a:; n pplymg only to ~uch Jll'rml~~~ble ~ubject s of 
r! •,.;t rautt a;; hn•a clw" of ronfidrncr and rm~a pproprwtwn of trade 
~l'l'n' t" Oth<·r qut'::;twn~ ma~· be· ra1,.;rd n" to thr tunr and cJrcum-
"tanc·l·~ ol rP"]HJllclPnt ~ rmplo~·m('nt and. the amount of any benefits 
•·arnrd and r<·rrwlnmg unpatd . All of tiWHC' mattrrH , whethrr thry 
tnvolvl' qur"t1on" of law or qur::;twn~ of fact an• m thr fir::;t mstancP 
proprrly tillh.wct to arhttratron ." 20 Cal. App. :~ct, at fi7a, 97 Cal. 
H pt r , at ,..., 15 
But no nH•ntrorl wa" made m Frame of§§ :.ZOO and 229 of thr 8tatr '::; 
Labor Cod<', :-l'l' n d, mfra, and, as tlw court latrr ~:ud m 
Warl', 14 C'nl Ap p. :~d. at 4:~. 100 Cal. Hptr. , at 797, " [t]hc Frame 
eourt dul not t•on~rder th<· pffP<·t ol ~<·c'tlOII ~:29 of thP Labor Code on 
th<· arlHtr;ttJOn Hgn•c·mpnt." Apparrntly, nr1thrr ::;idr 111 Frame 
"n11ght. rr·vrPw by tlw Ca lifornia Suprrrnr C'ourt 
' . 
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~haring Plan were wages. within the meaning of ~~ 200" 
and 229 7 of the California Labor Code, and that ~ 229 
gave Ware "the right to bring his claim in court in spite 
of any agreement to arbitrate." 24 Cal. App. 3d, at 43~ 
44. 100 Cal. Rptr .. at 797-798. Merrill Lynch's petition 
for hearing by the Supreme Court of ( 'alifornia was de~ 
11ied without opinion ~ee 24 Cal. App. 3d. at 45 
1 r 
The broad issue thus presented to us is the extent to 
\\·hich authority delegated under a federal regulatory 
statute pre-empts state law. ~pecifically, we are con~ 
err ned with the questions (a) whether. in the context. of 
the present case, ~ 229 of the California Labor Code, 
which would preclude compulsory arbitration of wage 
disputes. is i11effective under the ~upremacy Clause; 
(b) whether ~ 16600 of the California Business and Pro-
fessions Code unduly in tcrferes with federal regulation 
of the securities industry; and (c) whether th<" C'ali-
forma legislation unconstitutionally burdens interstate 
comnwreP 
'· ·§ 200 Delimtlon~ 
' A,.. u~ed 111 tlu~ nrt1elP: \11) · wage~ lllrlucl('~ all amount for labor 
pPrfortnl'U by employl'l'~ of PvPr~· de:srnpt10n, whethPr tlw amount 
~~ fixPd or a,;cNt<llllPd b~· the ~tamlard of tlmr, ta:;k, Jl!CCl', eornnus-
~ion ba:;J:;, or otlwr mrthocl of ralculat 1011 ' 
· '§ 229. Act10n~ to pnforeP paymPnt of wagP:>: pffprf of arbi-
' rat 1011 agrPrtn('llt,.. 
ActiOns to cnforcp tlw prOYIIiiOll,; of th1:; Mtiele lor the rollect10n 
ol dul• and unpaid wage:; rlanned b~ · an uHhvidual ma~· lw mmn-
tallt('d without rrgard to tlw l'X1Mtl'l1CP of any pnvatr agreement to 
arb1tratc. Th1s ~<'CtiOtl :-dudl not apply to claim~ mvolvmg any 
dll-ipute conerrnmg the mterprPtatJOH or applicatiOn of an~· rollectJVP 
hargammg agreNnPtlt ront<tllllll).!; :;uch an arb1tratwn agreement '·' 
S<'l'tlon 229 wa~ add<'d to tlw Cod<· 111 19.')9 . Cnl Stnts. 1959, 
' · t\.J:m . p 4.5:t~ . 
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i"haring Plan were wages. within the meaning of ~~ 200" 
and 229 ' of th(' California Labor Cod(', and that ~ 229 
gave Ware "the right to bring his claim in court in spite 
of any agreement to arbitrate." 24 Cal. App. 3d, at 43~ 
44, 100 Cal. Rptr., at 7~)7-7~!8. Merrill Lynch's petition 
for hearing by the Supreme Court of California was de~ 
nied without opiuion ~<'e 24 Cal. App. :~d. at 45 
1 r 
The broad issue thus presented to us is the ext<'nt to 
which authority delegated under a federal regulatory 
statute pre-empts state law. ~pecifically, we are con 4 
cerned with the questions (a) whether, in tho conte-xt of 
the present case, ~ 229 of the California Labor Code, 
which would preclud(' compulsory arbitration of wage 
disputes. is ineffective under the Supremacy Clause; 
(b) whether ~ 16600 of the California Business and Pro-
fesswns Code unduly interferes with federal regulation 
of the securities industry; and (c) whether the Call-
forma legislation unconstitutionally burdf'ns interstate 
commereP 
'• '§ 1()() l)('fillltlOll~ 
A,. u~ed 111 tlu~ arti("IP: (a J ·Wagp,.; uJCiud(•:-; all amount for labor 
JWrfunnPd by emplo~·pp::; of PV<'f~· dP:srnptwn, whPtlwr th(' amount 
1~ fixt>d or a:-;cNtnmPd b~· tlw ,.;tandard of ttntP, ta::<k, ]Her<·. <·ornmts-
~ion ba:s1:s, or otiH'r mPthod of ralrulatwn ' 
· '§ 229 . Act ton ~ to rnfore<· payrnrnt of wagP;; . pffrrt of arbi-
1 rat 1011 agrPrm!'Ill"" 
Actton,.; to cnl'ore(· tlw provi:,;JOn~ of tht;; arttrlr lor the collertwu 
of dnP aud uupaid wage~ rlamwd IJ_,. an IIIdtvidual may be mam-
iaul('d wtthout rPgnrd to tlw <'Xt~t<·ll('l' of any pnvatP agreement tu 
nrbit rate . Thiii ~<·rt 1011 iihall not appl~· to claun~ 111volvlllg any 
di~JlUI!:' concrrnmg the tntcrprPiatJOII or application of an~· eolll'rttvr 
bargammg all:l'PPmPnt rontam111g :-; ueh an arbttratwn agreement 
8P(·ttou 129 wa~ nddPd to tlH• C'odP Ill 19.19 . Cal Stat:-; 1959, 
, . w :{H p ~ !i:t? 
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In order to resolve these questiOns, we think it neces-
sary to review the principles of stock exchange pre-
<'mption delineated in this Court's decision a decade ago 
Ill Silver \' , :\'ew York Stock Exchange, 373 e. H. 341 
n 963). and to examine thr geneses of the federal Act 
and of the California statu t<• 
A. In 81:lver thE' Court considered whether. and Lo what 
(•xtent. the federal antitrust laws apply to secunties ex· 
changes regulated by the 1934 Act. lt held that the 
mere passage of the Act did not effect. pro tanto, a repeal 
of the federal antitrust laws. but that particular instances 
of exchange regulation that fall within the scope and 
purposes of the Act may be 1 ustified and will be upheld 
against antitrust challenge. ld .. at 357- 361. vYith re-
spect to thr specific question therr pre sen ted. it was clear 
that the 0: ew York ~tock Exchange had exercised its 
" tremendous economic pov.:rr." id., at 361. against two 
nonnwmbers by discontinuing their direct wire-telephone 
connections with members of the Exchange without 
notice , !waring, or statement of reasons. lt was the 
Court 's view. under thr Circumstances, that procedural 
guarantees \vere necessary in order to protrct against 
1e poss1 11ty o antitrust practices and to provide the 
·'f'xtremely beneficial f'ffrct in kreping exchange actwn 
from straying wto areas wholly foreign to the purposes 
of the Securities Exchange Act. " 1 d. , at 362. See also. 
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U . S. 2g9, 
ao0-301 ( 19n J 
1 n contrast with Silver, we are not confronted here 
with conflicting ff'deral regulatory schemes. ThE' present 
eon troversy concerns the interrelationship between stat-
utes adopted. respectively, by the Federal Govemmcnt 
and a ~tate. The analytical framework of Silver IS 
111structive. nonetheless. There the Court reviewed 
carefully the regulatory S<'curities exchange scheme that 
Congress had adopted in order to identlfy the character 
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and purposes of the Act and the extent to which instances 
of exchange self-regulation were necessary to the further-
ance of congressional aims and objectives. 373 U. S., at 
349-361. It was mindful, al o, of the purposes behind 
the conflicting statutes which, in that case, were the 
antitrust laws. So here, we may not overlook the body 
of law relating to the sensitive interrelationship between 
statutes adopted by the srparatc. yet coordinate, federal 
and state sovereignties. Our analysis is also to be tem-
pered by the conviction that the proper approach is to 
reconcile "the operation of both statutory schemes with 
onr another rather than holding one completely ousted." 
ld. , at 357.' The principle that emerged from Silver, 
and the premise upon which the Court based its judg-
ment, was that conflicting law, absent repealing or exclu-
sivity provisions, should be pre-empted by exchange self-
regulation "only to the extent 11ecessary to protect the 
achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act." 
fd., at 361. 
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 
15 l '. ::-1. C'. ~~ 78a to 78hh- l, "regulates securities mar-
kets and the business of securities brokers and dealers.' ' 
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. H. R. Doc. No. 95, 
Pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. , 3 (1963) . Two types of 
regulation are reflected i11 the Act. ~ome provisions 
tmpose direct requirements and 1)rohibitions. Among 
these arr mandatory exchange registration, restrictions 
on broker and dealer borrowing, and the prohibition of 
mani pu lati ve or deceptive prartices. Other provisious 
~This npproach ~ ~ Hupportl'd b)· dPciHIOllH cxtcndmg back to the 
turn of tlw century . Flonda Lzme & Auocado Growers, Int . v. Paul, 
37:3 P. 8. 1:32 , 14:2 (196:3); Huron Portland Cemeut ('o . v. City of 
Detroit, :35:2 ll. S. 440 (l9fi0); /uter11atwnal Assn. of Machimsts v 
Oouza/ei:i. :356 U.S. 617 (l!:l5X) ; l 'mo11 Brukeraue Cu., .. Jeusen, a:Z:! 
! '. S. 202. (l944) ; Savaol' v. Jo11e~, :225 (1 S. 50l (1912) . 
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are flexible and rely on the techmque of self-regulation 
to achieve their obJectives. Ibid. Supervised self-
regulation, although consonant with the traditional pri-
vate governance of exchanges, allows the Government to 
monitor exchange busmess in the public mterest.n MR. 
JusTICE DouGLAS, when he was Chairman of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, observed that this per-
mits the exchanges to "take the leadership with Govern-
ment playing a residual role. Government would keep 
the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well 
oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would 
never have to be used. " vV. Douglas, Democracy and 
Finance (Allen Ed. 1940) 82. 
The Act provides for stock exchanges to be registered 
by the Commission. ~ 6, 15 U. S. C. s 78f. It out-
laws securities transactions conducted on unregistered 
exchanges. ~ 5. 15 U. S. C. s 78e. It conditions reg-
tstration on a showing that the exchange has rules 
that are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and 
to protect investors.' ' ~ 6 (d). 15 U. S. C. ~ 78f (d). 
9 The fir~t at tempt at exchange regulatiOn arose after I he panic 
of 1907 when, in respon~e to puhhe concrrn over speculation, Presi-
dent Theodore Hoo~evelt uq1;rcl Congre~~ to take action. 42 Cong. 
Hec. 1:H7, 1:349 (1908). Nothing of ~ignificancc happened, however , 
until after the 1929 stock markN crash. It brcame apparent that 
'' transactions m :::eeunti e::: a,; commonly conducted upon securities 
rxchanges and ovcr-the-countPr market:; arp al'frctpd With a natiOnal 
public mtrrest which makt'~ it neces~a r~· to providP for regulation 
and control of such tmn~actwns and of practices and of matters 
related therPto." SrcuritJes Exchange Aet of 1934, § 2. 15 U. S. C . 
§ 78b. Self-rrgulat10n was adopted HS a mean~ of pohcmg the 
rxchanges TI1e tra(litJOn, as has brrn notre!, had been one of sclf-
governanee; thr financial community wa:-; strong!~· opposrd to gov-
rrnmrntal control of dail~· exchange bu~mes;;; nnd the ta;;k wao; 
dremrd to br of such magmtudr that Govrrnmmt ~imply rould not 
regulate rffectively evrr~· n~prct of tbr mdu~try. Comment, 48 
l\1um. L, Rev., 597-598 (19G4) , L Lm<~>, Sreunt)('::; Rrgulatwn, Vol , 
'2, pp 1175-117() (l9(il ), and Vol 5, pp :H38-:H:39 (1969) 
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An E'xchange sE'eking registratwn must also meet other 
requirements. It must agree "to enforce so far as is 
within its powers compliance by its membE'rs" with the 
Act and the Corn mission's rules and regulations there-
under. ~ 6 (a)(1), 15 U. S. C. § 78f (a)(1). It must 
mclude in its rules a provision for the disciplining 
of a member ''for conduct or proceeding inconsistent 
with JUSt and equitable principles of tradE'." ~ 6 (b) , 
15 11 . S.C. § 78f (b). And it must supply to the Com-
misswn copies of its constitution, articles of incorpora-
twn, and bylaws, and such data or other information as 
the Commission may require "as being necessary or 
appropriate in thE' public interest or for the protection 
of investors.'' ~ 6 (a)(3) and (2). 15 U. 8. C. § 78f (a) 
(3) and (2) . 
The Commisswn 's d1rect authonty With respect to 
exchan e self-regulation IS supervisory. Apart from 1ts 
-----------,.,.----c::re=-:s:::p:-:o:-:n:-:s~ib;:_-I~·~ ies in registering exchanges, thE' Commission 
may "alter or supplement'' the rules of an exchange if 
such action 1s ''necessary or appropriate for the protec-
tion of investors or to msure fair dealing in securities 
traded m upon such exchange or to msure fair ad-
ministration of such exchange." ~ 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. 
~ 78s (b).'" This authority, however, relates to 12 
designated subject areas and "similar matters." Ibid. 
As a consequence, some exchange rules are not subject 
to direct Commission scrutiny, In re Rules of the New 
York Stock Exchange, 10 S. E. C. 270, 294 ( 1941), and, 
instead, if they do not operate contrary to the interests 
of msuring fair dPaling and protecting investors, would 
kindle no fPderal curiosity and would serve no identifi-' 
1 " The Commt;:;swn abo ha;. broad rule-makmg power under the 
Al'i 8rr, for cxampiP, §§ K, 9, an<l 11, 15 ll S. C §§ 7Sh, 7Ri, and 
71-lk No qur~tion ~ ~ pre:;entrd 111 tim; Ci!H(' a~ to thr authority or 
1 ~~~ to rromnlgatr mle~ atff'rtmg thr oprrat10n of ::;tack 
ex<"haHgr'i-, 
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able public purpose. 1 t is to be noted, moreover, that 
the Commission has exercised its direct supervisory power 
sparingly . Securities Industry Study, Report of the 
Subcommittee on Securities, Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 180 ( 1973) 
Apart from registration and direct Commisswn super-
vision, the only other qualification on exchange autonomy 
is the statutory requirement that any rules promulgated 
and enforced by an exchange not be "inconsistent with 
this [Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder and 
the applicable laws of the State in which it is located.'' 
~ 6 (c), 15 U.S. C. ~ 78f (c) 
From this review of relevant portiOns of the Act, it 
ts apparent that Congress accorded maximum scope to 
self-regulation, and reposed powers in the Commission 
"to be exercised as needed but in such manner as to allow 
maximum initiative and responsibility to the self-
regulators." Report of the Special Study, supra, Pts. 
4-6, at 726. In the words of the Senate Report issued 
at the time of enactment. 
"Thus the initiative and responsibility for promul-
gating regulations pertaining to the administration 
of their ordinary affairs remain with the exchanges 
themselves. It is only where they fail adequately 
to provide protection to investors that the Commis-
sion is authorized to step in and compel them to do 
so." S. Rep. No. 792. 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 
(1934) 
It 1s thus clear that the congressiOnal aim 111 super-
vised self -regulation is to insure fair dealing and to pro-
tect investors from harmful or unfair trading practices. 
To the extent that any exchange rule or practice contra-
venes this policy, or any authorized rule or regulation 
under thP Act, the rulp may be subject to appropriate 
72-312-0PINION 
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federal regulatory supervision or action. Correspond-
ingly, any rule or practice not germane to fair dealing 
or investor protection would not appear to fall under the 
shadow of the federal umbrella; it is, instead. subject to 
applicable state law. 
C. On the other side are the Califorma statutes. By 
the addition of ~ 229 to its Labor Code in 1959 Califomia 
codified for the wage earner, with the solitary collective 
bargaining agreement exception. a right of action to 
recover clue and unpaid wages from his employer, regard-
less of the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate Selected 1959 Code Legislation, 34 C'al. St. B. J. 
581, 706-707. This was due, apparently, to the legisla-
ture's desire to protect the worker from the exploitative 
employer who would demand that a prospective employee 
sign away in advance his rigl1t to resort to the judicial 
system for redress of an employment grievance. The 
statute's legislative history is sparse, but the exception 
carved out for collective bargaining disputes provides the 
obvious conclusion that it was the individual. nonunion 
and otherwise unprotected wage earner who was the 
intended beneficiary of the State's grace in providing this 
remedy. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that 
§ 200 (a) of the Code defines "wages" broadly to inc] ucle 
"all amounts for labor performed by employees of every 
description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained 
by the standard of time, task, place. commission, basis, 
or other method of calculation. ' ' And the C'aliforma 
court itself has noted "the established policy . . . of pro-
tecting and promoting" the right, " 'favored' in the law/' 
of the wage earner "to all wages lawfully accrued to 
him." City of Ukiah v. Fones, 64 Cal. 2cl 104, 108, 410 
P. 2d 369. 371 ( 1066). It may be, too, that the legisla-
ture felt that arbitration was a less than adequate pro-
tection against awarding the wage earner something short 
of what was due comp('nsation . I 11 any event, there is 
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the harder substance of C'aliforuia case law. In Local 
659 v. Color· Corp. of America, 47 Cal. 2cl 189, 302 P. 294 
(1956). decided prior to the addition of ~ 229 to the 
Labor Code. the court held that the then ~ 1280 of the 
State's Code of Civil Procedure, providing for the 
euforcement of an arbitration clause iu a contract and 
characterizing it as "irrevocable," was subject to waiver 
or mutual rescission. The statute provided that arbi-
tratiou was required "save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 11 
California, thus, does not exclude a remedy available at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract that 
happens to contain an arbitration clause. 
This conclusion as to the broad and liberal intendment 
of ~ 229 is reinforced by the Court of Appeal's observa-
tion in the present case. 24 Cal. App. 3d. at 44- 45. 100 
Cal. Rptr., at 798, that the State's Arbitration Act, 
revised in 1961, embraced no attempt to change the right 
of action first accorded the wage earner only two years 
rarlier in 1959. The record is clear, moreover, that legis-
lative attention was drawn in 1961 to ~ 229. The Cali-
fornia Senate was asked to reconsider its unanimous vote 
in favor of the Arbitration Act on the ground that there 
was legislative uncertainty as to its effect upon ~ 229. 
2 Journal of the Senate 2215-2218 (May 4, 1961). The 
motion to reconsider was later waived, and the bill was 
transmitted to the Assembly. !d., at 2287 (May 8, 
1961). Thus, the Senate hac! in mind the rights accorded 
wage earners by ~ 229, and those rights were placed in 
focus with the "historic friendliness of California to the 
institution of arbitration." E. Feldman , Arbitration 
Modernization-The New California Arbitration Act, 34 
11 SE'ctwn 1280 wn~ rep0a l('c[ and f('p]nrC'd 111 l\J60 to mak(' tht' 
1>:1vmg clau~C' now !'('fld, "~av(' upon ~ueh grounds as rxis1 for the 
revoc<ttwn of any contract" Cal. Stat::; . 1961 , r 461 , pp. 1541- 1542,, 
~§ J all(( 2. 
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So. Calif. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1961). Section 229 thus sur-
vived subsequent legislative scrutiny and has now mani-
~----r----:f21 sted itself as an important state policy through inter-
pretation by the California courts. 
One might also consider, as the respondent suggests 
here, the California antitrust policies embodied in ~ 16600 
of the Business and Corporation Code, quoted, ante, 
p. -. This statute has been in effect for many years 
and is well entrenched in case law and in commentary.12 
We need not pursue in depth the policy considerations 
supporting this statute because, in our judgmeut, § 16600, 
standing alone and apart from ~ 229, under existing case 
law, would not provide the necessary support to uphold 
a challenge to arbitration. Our inclination in this re-
spect is buttressed by the different results reached by 
the California Court of Appeal in this case and in Prame, 
supra, respectively. In Frame, the court decided that 
the "strong California public policy" against restraining 
one from engaging in a lawful business foreclosed the ap-
plication of the more permissive New York law to the 
forfeiture provision of the profit-sharing plan. Although 
California public policy thus served to nullify the con-
tract's forfeiture provision, arbitration, nonetheless, was 
not@~. By way of contrast, the present case 
])fOvoked a claim under § 229, in addition to Ware's 
reliance on § 16600, in the face of Morrill Lynch's mo-
tion to compel arbitration. The California court declared 
again that the forfeiture clause was invalid but, in addi-
tion, held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable, 
relying ou ~ 16600 and ~ 229, respectively. With this 
analysis of the state statutes made by the California 
court, we rest on that court's interpretation of state law 
and do not, and in fact cannot, disturb its determination 
12 Sec citation~ followmg § 16600 m We~t'~ Ann. Cahf. Bus. & 
Prof. Codr, p 41, et ~eq . 
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that under those statutes arbitration will lie in the one 
mstance but not in the other. 
With this background, we turn to specific arguments 
atl.vanced by the petitioner here. 
TII 
A. Merrill Lynch suggests that Rule 347 (b) of the 
New York Stock Exchange, set forth in n. 3, supra, 
falls under the Exchange's mandate to protect the in-
vesting public and to insure just and equitable trade 
practices.'" Its contention is that confidence in the in-
dustry and in the integrity and ability of its members 
has been Jeopardized by failures of major brokerage 
houses with consequent substa11tial losses to the public. 
lnvestor confidence would be further undermined, it 
IS said, by protracted litigation between member firms 
and their employees over disputes that arise out of em-
ployment relationships; public airing of every claim 
of this kind will erode confidence in the market; and 
arbitration, on the other hand, will internalize these 
disputes and provide an expeditious and economical 
method of resolution by arbitrators familiar with in-
dustry customs and practices. 
As is seen by our discussion above.~~ 6 (d) and 19 (b) 
of the Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ ~ 78f (d) and 78s (b), establish 
the measure of congressionally delegated authority for 
self-regulation in the national interest. Section 6 (d) 
requires that exchange rules be "just and adequate to 
13 Tlw phrase "ju;;t and equttablr trade practir('~" does not have 
its vrrb11tim counterpart in the :;tatutr. It would be inappropriately 
used to Justify Rule :347 (b). Th1~ is b<:>cau~c· thr sta ndard r<:>fer~ to 
rul<:>~ adopt<:>d pursuant to §f) (b) of tlw Art, 15 U.S. C. §78f (b), 
provtdmg for th<:> C'xpul ~ ton, l:iUSJ)('l1l:iJOn or disciplining of a memb0r 
' 'fo r conduct or preceeding inconsistent wtth JUi:it and equitable pnn-
rtp l<'s of trade ." Arbitration ts not the type of disciplinary rulC' 
thnt § 6 (b) contrmplate~ . 
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insure fair dealing and to protect investors." Section 
19 (b) gives the Commission limited power over certain 
types of exchange rules "for the protection of investors 
or to insure fair dealing in securities" or to "insure fair 
administration" of the exchanges. 11 Measured by these 
standards, we conclude that the policy arguments ad-
vanced by Merrill Lynch do not requirP pre-emption of 
contrary state law by Rule 347 (b). 
To begin with the obvious, there is nothing in the Act 
and there is no Commission rule or regulation that speci-
fies arbitration as the favored means of resolving 
employer-employee disputes.'' It is also clear that Rule 
347 (b) would not be subject to the Commission's modi-
fication or review under ~ 19 (b). The United States, 
as amicus, concedes as much, and we conclude, as the 
Government suggests, that the relationship between com-
pulsory employer-employee arbitratio11 and fair dealing 
and investor protection is "extremely attenuated and 
peripheral, if it exists at all.'' Brief for the United 
14 A~ noted above, ante, p. --, the Commi~~Ion's review power 
over exrhan!!;e rule~ i~ circumscribed b~· certain ~ubJect matter limi-
tations explicitly enumerated in § 19 (b). ~one of the ~ub]ect 
matter catrgor1es sugge~t~ that thr Commi~~ion has review authority 
with re~pcct to :1 rule reqUiring arbitration of employer-employee 
disputes. 
'"This Court and other fedrral courts, of com~P. have endorsed 
the ~mtability of arbitration to rE'solve federally created rights. 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 lJ . S. 427, 431 (195:3); C'oenPn v. R. W. Press-
prich & Co., 45:3 F. :2d 1:209 (CA2 1972), rert. drnird, 406 U.S. 949 
(1972). Srr other r:tse:; ritPd by :\IR . .JusTICE WHITE in Jus dissent-
mg opinion in U. 8. Bulk Camers, Inc. v. Arg·uelles, 400 U.S. 351, 
:374-:n5 (1971). ThPSP case~. however, conrrrn sit uationti where a 
fpcleral act Ilt>rlf ha~ provided for arbitratJOn. Yet 111 Wilko v . 
.Swan an investor ru~tomrr'ti agreement to arb1tntte wm; held vmd 
undN § 14 of the Securitirs Act of 19:3:3, 15 U.S. C.§ 77n, notwith-
~tanding thr provision~ of§ :3 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S. C. § ·:3. 
Ser PPrma Paint Corp \'. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., :388 U S. 395 
( 1967). 
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States 9. Merrill Lynch has not alleged that arbitration 
will effect fair dealing or result in investor protection. 
l t suggests only that investor confidence not be shaken 
further by public airing of employer-employee disputes; 
There is no explanation of why a judicial proceeding, 
even though public, would undermine investor confidence. 
It is difficult to understand why muffling a grievance in 
the cloakroom of arbitration would prevent lessening of 
confidence in the market. To the contrary, for the gen-
erally sophi~ticated investing public, market confidence 
may tend to be restored in the light of impartial public 
court adjudication. Furthermore, it should be apparent 
that, so far as investor confidence is concerned , com-
pulsory arbitration of a labor dispute is no substitute 
for direct effective disciplinary action against any abusive 
exchange practice. Other rules of the exchange serve 
this very function. Rule 345 (b), for example, permits 
the exchange to disapprove, and thereby to forestall, the 
employment of any person, and Rule 345 (c) spells out 
punitive measures for "conduct inconsistent with just and 
equitable principles of trade," or "acts detrimental to 
the interest or welfare of the Exchange," or "conduct 
contrary to an established practice of the Exchange." 
These measures, designed to insure fair dealing and to. 
protect investors, are of the kind directly related to the 
Act's purposes and ordinarily would not be expected to 
yield to provisions of state law. 
B. Rule 347 (b) cannot be categorized, as the peti-
tioner suggests, as part of a need for uniform national 
regulation. There is no revelation in the Act or in any 
Commission rule or regulation that nation-wide U11i-
formity of an exchange's housekeeping affairs is neces-
sary or desirable. And Merrill Lynch has not demon-
strated that national uniformity in the area of wage. 
claims is vital, in some way, to federal securities policy .. 
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Convenience in exchange management may be desirable, 
but it does not support a plea for uniform application 
when the rule to be applied is not necessary for the 
acievement of the national policy objectives reflected in 
the Act. Indeed , Congress, in the securities field, has 
not adopted a regulation system wholly apart from and 
exclusive of state regulation. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corp ., 331 U. S. 218, 234-236 ( 1D47); Campbell 
\ . Hussey, 368 U.S. 297,302 (1961). Instead, Congress 
intended to subject the exchanges to state regulation 
that is not inconsistent with the federal act. Section 
6 (c) , 15 U. S. C. ~ 78f (c) , explicitly subjects exchange 
rules to a requirement of consistency with the Act "and 
the applicable laws of the State in which it is located. " 
''Where the Government has provided for collaboration 
the courts should not find conflict.'' Union Brokerage 
Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, 20!1 ( 1944). And we ob-
served in Silver that the scheme of self-regulation pro-
vides in some cases for no agency check on exchange 
behavior and, therefore, "[s]ome form of revtew of ex-
change self-policing, whether by administrative agency 
or by the courts, is . . . not at all incompatible with 
the fulfillment of the aims of the Securities Exchange 
Act." 373 U. ~- . at 351:!. 
C. It is also argued that the applicable state laws 
referred to in ~ 6 (c) are the laws of the State in whJCh 
the exchange itself is located. Thus, because the New 
York Stock Exchange is in the City of New York, tt 
is said that ''the applicable laws '' are those of New York, 
and that the California court was in error m not applying 
New York law that would have compelled arbitration 
of thts dispute and would have validated the forfeiture 
provision of the Profit ~haring Plan . 
We are not persuaded that this is what Congress in-. 
tended , Section 6 (c) has no independent existence ere-
' . 
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atiHg some sort of spurwus umformity of application for 
all States. [t has meaning only iu the context of thf' 
assertion of a federal interest. and it hinges on our de-
termination that the particular rule be integrally related 
to or substantially effect the aims and purposes of the 
Act. lt merely requires that any exchange rule adopted 
outside the context of the Act be consist<>nt with the 
laws of the :-ltatc in which the exchange is located.'" 
If the rule is sought to be enforced in another State. 
IIonnal conflicts principles come into play, and the rule's 
effect depends on the resol utwn of that conflict. Were 
this not so, there would be 110 purpose behind the choice 
of law clause 111 the Profit Sharing Plan 1tse1f. More 
unportantly . the uniform application Merrill Lynch's 
Interpretation of the Act woukl purportedly foster is seen 
to be ephemeral when one comiders that broker-dealers 
like petitioner are also members of exchanges located 
outside New York, and are therefore subJect, under the 
"state of location" theory, to other 8tates · laws. In 
effect, we arc asked to sacrifice the individual's expecta-
tion of uniform treatment in the State of his residence 
for uniformity of application of the effect of au ex~ 
change's rules. We decline to do so because we believe 
1" Tlw Act rontmn~ ot h('T' JH'OVIC>JOn~ mdicntlllg t lw IllTPilt of 
CongrP~::; that .,;tate law c·ontinuP>< to appl~· where tlw Aet itself dor::; 
not. Thu~, §2S(a), 15 U. 8. C. §iRbb(a) , ~tat('~ that the nght~ 
and n'medw::; provided b~ · thP Act ";;hall be Ill adchtwn to any and 
all othPr rights and rPmPche" that may PXI:>t at law or in eqUity ." 
It furtlwr prov1dPH that nothmg Ill the Art "c;hall affect thC' JUnsdiC-
t!On of the ::<Pcunw·~ commis::;wn . . of any State• . . m::;ofar a~ 1t 
dor~ not ronftici With thC' prov1~1on::; " of tlw Aet "or thr rules and 
rPgulatJOntl thPrPtmdC'r ... S('rtwn 2H (bJ, 15 l '- 8. C § i8bb (b), 
provide::; that nothmg 111 th(' Art "~hall be con~trurd to modify exJ::;i-
ing law w1th rc•gard to the bmding elferi of [ PxchangeJ 
<H'tlon t akrn . to c;Ptt iC' d1spute::; bet wpen Jt;:; mPmber~ on any 
lJ('T'"on who h;tl' agreed to hr hound thrrrb' 
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that Congress intended that those elements of the old 
regime of complete self-regulation, that is. those elements 
not related to the federal obJectives, be subject to state 
law and to established conflicts principles when their 
application out-of-State comes into controversy. After 
all, a stock exchange is organized as an association in 
accordance with the laws of the State of its location. 
Any asertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction contends, of 
course. with the public policy of the State in which this 
jurisdiction is sought. To ascribe more to ~ 6 (c) would 
be contrary to the congresE.ional scheme and to what 
might be regarded as common sense. 
D. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN has stated. 
"The principle to be derived from our decisions is 
that federal regulation of a field of commerce should 
110t be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power 
tn the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the 
11ature of the regulated subject matter permits no 
other conclusion. or that the Congress has unmis-
takably so ordained. ·· Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc . v. Paul, 373 l'. S. 132. 142 ( 1963) . 
ln other contexts, pre-emption has been measured by 
whether the state statute frustrates any part of the pur-
pose of the federal legislation. Coloardo Anti-Discrimt-
nation Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U. :::1. 
714, 724 ( 1963); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637 
(1971); Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247,253-255 
( 1947) . And only last term MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, in 
speaking for the Court. observed that while prior cases 
ou pre-emption ''are not precise guidelines," because "each 
tums on the peculiarities and special features of the 
federal regulatory scheme in question,'' it rs where there 
is lll existence a pervasive and comprehensive scheme of 
federal regulation that pre-emption follows in order to 
fulfill the federal statutory purposPs. C'dy of Burbank 
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'"· Lockheed Air Termmal, Inc., 411 U. S. 624, 638-639 
(1973) . 
In the area of regulatiOn that we are considering here, 
California has manifested a strong policy of protecting 
its wage earners from what it regards as undesirable 
economic pressures affecting the employment relation-
ship. These policies prevail in the absence of interfer-
ence with the federal regulatory scheme. We find no 
such interference and we also find in the structure of the 
Act an intent on the part of Congress that state policies 
in this area should operate vigorously. 
E. It is suggested, finally, that the petitioner's Profit 
Sharing Plan operates on a national level; that it is open 
to all eligible Merrill Lynch employees in the United 
fitates; that the respondents ' employment is interstate 
111 nature, as is Merrill Lynch's business; and that the 
application of the California statutes would unduly bur-
den interstate commerce. 
What has been said above provides the answer to this 
argument. It is in line with the principle, long estab-
11she , that the National Government's power. under the 
Commerce Clause, to regulate commerce does not exclude 
all state power of regulation. Southern Pacific Co. v. 
An.zona, 325 U. S. 761. 766-767 (1945); Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R. I . & 
P. R . Co., 393 t:'. S. 129 (1968); Huron Portland Cement 
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960). 
The .Judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
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